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Securing Social Security: Sensitivity to Economic  
Assumptions and Analysis of Policy Options 
 






Revamping the Social Security program has become a domestic policy priority of the 
Bush administration.  The President has stated that the system is facing a “crisis” and will 
be “bankrupt” in 2041.  His proposal to change Social Security is centered on the 
introduction of private accounts that would allow workers to direct a share of their Social 
Security taxes into investments such as stocks and bonds.  In this paper we consider 
whether Social Security is really facing a crisis and whether any potential future 
shortfalls could be remedied without changing the basic structure of the existing program. 
 
Projections of Social Security’s finances, published by the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), are based on demographic and 
economic assumptions involving considerable uncertainty.  The President’s assertions of 
a system headed towards bankruptcy refer to recent analysis by the SSA that projects that 
the Social Security trust funds will become depleted in 2041.  However, this estimate is 
one of three projections presented in the SSA report – in one scenario the trust funds 
become depleted in 2030 but in the other case the program is able to provide scheduled 
benefits through 2080 without any financial shortfall.  Meanwhile, the CBO projection 
estimates that the trust funds will remain solvent until 2052.   
 
The different forecasts are a result of differences in assumptions.  The projections 
published by the government agencies provide forecasts based on four specific sets of 
assumptions.  In this paper we analyze the sensitivity of Social Security’s future to a 
broader range of economic assumptions.  One scenario of particular interest that we 
analyze uses the assumptions made in the federal budget – assumptions that are quite 
favorable to the future finances of Social Security. 
 
We also seek to determine the range of policy options within the current structure of the 
Social Security program that could be used to eliminate any funding shortfall over the 
standard 75-year planning period.  These options include increasing the cap on income 
subject to Social Security taxation, increasing the Social Security tax rate, increasing the 
taxation of Social Security benefits, and slowing the growth of Social Security benefit 
payments.  These options leave the basic structure of Social Security unchanged and are 
not dependent on the introduction of private accounts. 
 
While the SSA and CBO have developed complex models to analyze the future finances 
of Social Security, these models are not readily available.  Our approach in this paper is 
                                                 
1 The authors are, respectively, research associate and senior researcher at the Global Development and 
Environment Institute, Tufts University.  Inquiries can be sent to brian.roach@tufts.edu. GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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to develop a relatively simple, transparent, and accurate model that can replicate the 
baseline analysis of the government agencies and be used to produce valid forecasts 
under a wide range of economic assumptions and policy alternatives.  Our model, 
explained in full detail in the paper, produces annual estimates of Social Security 
revenues and outlays as well as the balance in the trust funds.  We test the validity of our 
model using several criteria, directly comparing our results with those produced by the 
government agencies.  In general, our model produces results that reasonably replicate 
the published data.  Thus while we recognize the limitations of our model, we consider it 
a useful tool that can be used to produce plausible forecasts under alternative assumptions 
and policy applications. 
 
In our analysis of the future finances of Social Security using the assumptions made in 
the federal budget, we project that the trust funds would last until 2065 and that the 75-
year shortfall could be eliminated by raising the Social Security tax by 0.24 percentage 
points.  For comparison, the SSA’s intermediate scenario concludes that Social Security 
tax rates would need to increase by about two percentage points to close the 75-year 
actuarial gap.  This suggests that under the President’s own assumptions made in the 
federal budget, Social Security faces a much less urgent “crisis” that could be remedied 
by a minor adjustment to the current system – costing the average household about $100 
per year. 
 
We also determine the long-run economic conditions that would bring the Social Security 
system into actuarial balance for the 75-year planning period.  We first consider changing 
the long-run assumed value of just one economic variable at a time.  From a baseline 
using the assumptions from the SSA’s intermediate scenario, we find that the actuarial 
gap in Social Security would be closed by: 
 
•  Increasing the assumed annual growth rate of real wages from 1.1% to 2.85%, or 
•  Lowering the assumed long-term inflation rate from 2.8% annually to 1.5%, or 
•  Increasing the real rate of return on the trust funds from 3.0% to 5.5%. 
 
We then determine several combinations of economic assumptions that would eliminate 
the funding gap.  Of course, these values cannot simply be chosen by policy makers but 
the results suggest that macroeconomic policy can be an effective tool in addressing at 
least a share of Social Security’s projected shortfall. 
 
We also explore the potential for various policy actions to bring the Social Security 
program into balance.  Our results indicate that the 75-year funding gap could be 
eliminated by increasing the cap on income subject to Social Security taxation, by 
slowing the growth of benefit payments, or raising the Social Security tax rate.  However, 
increasing the taxation of Social Security benefits, without any other changes, would not 
be sufficient to close the funding gap. 
 
As an example of a policy that could bring the system into balance, eliminating the cap 
on annual income subject to Social Security taxation would be more than sufficient.  We 
also show that the 75-year actuarial gap could be eliminated by slightly slowing the GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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growth in average benefit payments.  Given that average Social Security benefit 
payments currently grow faster than inflation (as long as real wages are growing), we 
estimate that the shortfall can be offset while still allowing average benefits to grow in 
real terms by 58% between 2005 and 2080.  In addition to analyzing each policy in 
isolation, we indicate several combinations of policies, without altering the basic 
structure of the program, which could be used to bring Social Security into balance 
through 2080. 
 
The perception of a crisis in Social Security is a relative and subjective viewpoint.  It is 
true that under a range of plausible economic assumptions the program will not be able to 
provide currently scheduled benefits through 2080.  However, even if the trust funds are 
eventually depleted, it is important to realize that the system will still be able to pay 
benefits from ongoing Social Security taxes.  The SSA estimates that once the trust funds 
are depleted, it will still be able to pay 74% of currently scheduled benefits. 
 
Another important point is that forecasts for the future of Social Security have been, and 
will continue to be, periodically revised.  In the 1997 Social Security Trustees’ report the 
intermediate scenario predicted that the combined trust funds would become depleted in 
2029.  Just five years later, in the 2002 report, the projected date for the depletion of the 
trust funds had been extended to 2041.  As more information is available and 
expectations are altered, future Social Security reports will present revised analyses.  A 
potential danger of a major overhaul intended to “permanently” fix Social Security is that 
changes in demographic or economic conditions will dictate that additional, possibly 
significant, changes be made.  A measured approach that allows for future flexibility 
appears most desirable. 
 
In conclusion, the Social Security program will need to be adjusted to reflect modern 
realities, just as it has been many times since its inception 70 years ago.  For example, the 
Social Security tax rate has been increased twenty times since 1950, including five times 
in the 1980s.  Does the Social Security system need to be totally overhauled?  We believe 
that the system is not in crisis and cannot go bankrupt as long as revenues continue to be 
collected.  We show in this paper that a wide range of existing policy options could be 
used to secure the finances of Social Security for the next 75 years without major 
structural changes.  These options could be phased in gradually and incrementally 
adjusted as more information becomes available, while continuing to provide 
beneficiaries with a stable and predictable source of retirement income.   GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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“… by the year 2041, the entire system will be bankrupt.” 
 
- President Bush speaking in reference to the Social Security program, 





The President’s statement that Social Security will be “broke” in 2041 is based on the 
2005 annual report produced by the Social Security Administration (SSA) Trustees 
detailing the current and projected finances of the program.
3  This report projects that in 
2041 the Social Security trust funds
4 will become depleted if the system continues to pay 
benefits under current law.  Once the trust funds are depleted, the SSA projects that 
Social Security revenues will be sufficient to pay only 74% of scheduled benefits.  This is 
what the President interprets as the system being “bankrupt.” 
 
This is not the only projection of the future finances of the Social Security program.  Two 
other sets of projections are presented in the 2005 SSA report – a “low cost” projection 
which makes relatively optimistic assumptions about variables pertinent to Social 
Security’s outlook and a “high cost” projection which makes relatively pessimistic 
assumptions.  In the high cost scenario, the combined Social Security trust funds become 
depleted in 2030, eleven years earlier than in the intermediate case.  But in the low cost 
scenario, the trust funds are not depleted during the 75-year horizon considered in the 
report.  Even further, in this case the balances in the trust funds continually increase, 
implying that benefits could be increased and/or taxes decreased. 
 
The Role of Economic Assumptions in Projecting Social Security’s Finances 
 
Social Security projections have also been complied by the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO).
5  The CBO projects that the trust funds will become depleted in 2052 and that 
revenues after that would be sufficient to pay 78% of scheduled benefits.  The main 
reason the CBO projects that the trust funds will maintain a positive balance for a longer 
period of time is that the CBO’s economic assumptions are more optimistic than those 
used by the SSA.  The differences in the long-term assumed values of several key 
economic variables are presented in Table 1.  For each of these four variables, the value 
assumed by the CBO is more favorable for the future of Social Security’s finances.  The 
more encouraging outcome is explained by the following relationships: 
 
•  The higher the rate of real earnings growth, the higher the total income subject to 
Social Security taxation. 
                                                 
2 Excerpt from speech made at the South Carolina Statehouse, Columbia, South Carolina.  Text available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050418-1.html.  
3 Full report available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR05/tr05.pdf.  
4 There are actually two Social Security trust funds.  One is the Old-Age and Survivors trust fund and the 
other is the Disability Insurance trust fund.   
5 Full report available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5530/06-14-SocialSecurity.pdf.  The long-
term projections were updated in March 2005, see 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=6064&sequence=0.    GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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•  The higher the real interest rate, the higher the return on investments made with 
the trust fund balances. 
•  The lower the rate of inflation, the lower the required annual increase in Social 
Security benefit payments to provide cost-of-living adjustments. 
•  The lower the unemployment rate, the more workers pay Social Security taxes. 
 
 
Table 1. Long-term Economic Assumptions Used to Model Social Security Finances by 









(Low Cost Scenario) 
Real Earnings Growth  1.3%  1.1%  1.6% 
Real Interest Rate  3.3%  3.0%  3.7% 
Inflation 2.2%  2.8%  1.8% 
Unemployment Rate  5.2%  5.5%  4.5% 
 
 
With the exception of the inflation rate, the differences between the assumptions made by 
the SSA in their intermediate scenario and the CBO are 0.3 percentage points or less.  
Table 1 also presents the “low cost” assumptions made by the SSA.  For each of the four 
variables, we see that these values are even more favorable to Social Security’s finances 
than the CBO values.  But while the differences between the CBO and SSA low cost 
assumptions may not appear large in magnitude, the resulting projections are dramatically 
different.  In one case (the CBO analysis) the trust funds are depleted in 2052 while in the 
other case the trust funds accrue sustained and growing balances. 
 
Comparison of Economic Assumptions 
 
The Bush administration has proposed a dramatic overhaul of Social Security 
emphasizing private investment accounts.  The President claims that this plan is needed 
in response to the expected future insolvency of the Social Security program.  However, 
as we see in the CBO and SSA analyses, the solvency of the program depends heavily on 
the assumed values of key economic variables; relatively minor changes in the 
assumptions can make a tremendous difference in the outlook for Social Security.  The 
President’s case for Social Security reform is bolstered by a pessimistic outlook for 
Social Security based on relatively unfavorable economic assumptions. 
 
At the same time, the President has committed to reducing the federal budget deficit.  The 
President’s 2006 budget projects a declining federal budget deficit – down from 4.5% of 
GDP in 2004 to 1.3% of GDP in 2010.
6  These projections are also based on assumptions 
for the future values of key economic variables.  But the very same assumptions that 
would paint a bleak picture for Social Security’s future would also imply relatively slow 
economic growth and a comparatively higher federal budget deficit. 
                                                 




The 2006 federal budget projections only cover the period 2004-2010 while the Social 
Security projections by the CBO and SSA cover a much longer time period.  In all cases, 
the analyses do not apply a single annual value for each variable to the entire time period.  
The federal budget generally assumes different economic values for each year from 2004-
2010 but by the end of this period the values have generally stabilized to, apparently, 
their long-term expectations.  The CBO makes specific numerical assumptions for 
different years but these values are relatively stable after the first several years of the time 
period.  The SSA generally makes stable long-term economic assumptions for the period 
2015-2080 with values varying in specific years prior to 2015.  However, by 2010 the 
assumed values are very close to the long-term assumptions. 
 
So, for the period 2004-2010 we can compare the economic assumptions made in the 
federal budget with the assumptions made by the SSA and the CBO.  In all three 
analyses, the assumed economic values basically stabilize to long-term expectations by 
2010.  Several economic variables are included in each analysis and can be directly 
compared.  These include the Consumer Price Index (CPI) growth, the unemployment 
rate, the real rate of interest on Treasury bills, and the growth rate of GDP.  The 
comparable data for 2004 through 2010 from all three sources are graphed in Figures 1-4.  
We see in each case that the assumptions made in the federal budget are more favorable 
to the finances of Social Security than those made by the SSA in their intermediate case.   
 
•  For the CPI, the federal budget makes a long-term (2007 and beyond) 
assumption that is between the values applied by the SSA and CBO.   
•  The federal budget makes the lowest projection of the unemployment rate 
beyond 2007.   
•  The federal budget makes the same assumption in 2010 as the CBO regarding 
the real rate of interest.   
•  The federal budget makes the most optimistic projections of GDP growth for 
2007 and beyond. 
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Based on Figures 1-4, we can conclude that performing an analysis of Social Security 
based on the long-term economic assumptions made in the federal budget for the CPI, 
unemployment rate, the real interest rate, and the rate of GDP growth would result in a 
more optimistic forecast for the finances of the program than in the SSA’s intermediate 
case.  The long-term assumptions made in the federal budget for the unemployment rate 
and GDP growth are even more favorable to the finances of Social Security than those 
made by the CBO.  The federal budget makes the same long term assumption as the CBO 
regarding the real interest rate.  Only with the CPI does the federal budget make an 
assumption that is less favorable towards Social Security’s solvency than the CBO.  
Based on these data, we can conclude that applying the Bush administration’s federal 
budget assumptions regarding these four variables to an analysis of Social Security would 
extent the solvency period of the Social Security trust funds beyond 2041. 
 
A key variable in an analysis of Social Security is the overall growth rate of wage and 
salary earnings subject to Social Security taxation.  The SSA presents assumptions about 
the growth of the real wage differential – the difference between the growth of nominal 
wages covered by Social Security and inflation.  As shown in Table 1, the CBO assumes 
that real wages will grow by 1.3% annually in the long-term while the SSA, in its 
intermediate scenario, assumes a 1.1% rate of wage growth.  The federal budget presents 
assumptions of the total wage and salary income, in current dollars, for 2004-2010.  By 
adjusting these values for the growth of prices and the labor force,
7 one can calculate the 
implied rate of wage and salary growth assumed in the federal budget. 
 
The assumptions of real wage growth from various sources are presented in Figure 5.  In 
this case, it is illustrative to include the SSA’s low cost assumptions – assumptions that 
would be very favorable to the future finances of Social Security.  In Figure 5 we see the 
most dramatic difference in assumed values between the federal budget and the Social 
Security analyses.  The federal budget assumes that real wages and salaries will grow by 
over 2% per year from 2006-2010, peaking at 2.6% in 2008 and falling slightly to 2.4% 
in 2010.  Meanwhile, the most optimistic forecast made by the SSA, in their low cost 
scenario, projects real wages growing by less than 2% in the long term (1.6% per year 
over the period 2015-2080). 
 
Yet again we see the federal budget making an economic assumption that if applied to an 
analysis of Social Security would imply higher balances and a longer life for the trust 
funds.  Assuming that real wages will grow by 2.4% per year in the long run, along with 
the other federal budget assumptions, could result in the conclusion that Social Security 
will be able to provide full benefits for any foreseeable future. 
 
How can the federal budget make such a significantly different assumption regarding the 
growth of real wages than the Social Security analyses?  The text of the budget notes that 
“In recent years, growth of labor compensation adjusted for inflation has not kept up with 
the growth of productivity. During the projection period, however, labor compensation is  
                                                 
7 The growth of the labor force for 2004-2010 taken from the SSA’s intermediate scenario. GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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expected to catch up, which would raise the labor share in GDP back to its historical 
average.”
8  Meanwhile, the Social Security analyses implicitly assume that real wages 
will not “catch up” but will instead continue along their recent trajectory of relatively low 
growth.  As an interesting aside, the federal budget assumes that pre-tax corporate profits 
will remain approximately $1.3 trillion per year, in current dollars, for the period 2005-
2010.  When adjusted for inflation, corporate profits would actually decrease by about 
2.4% per year.  There is no obvious historical precedent for such an assumption of 
declining corporate profits during a time of consistent wage and GDP growth. 
 
These differences in economic assumptions suggest the basis for an interesting 
experiment.  What would result from an analysis using the federal budget’s economic 
assumptions to model the future of Social Security?  Would Social Security be solvent for 
the 75-year planning period using the federal budget’s assumptions?  Further, what 
different combinations of economic assumptions would be required to bring the Social 
Security system into actuarial balance for the 75-year planning period?  Further, what 
policy approaches could be used to bring the system into balance?  We attempt to answer 
these questions in this paper.  We will show that many policy options are available to 
address the projected funding shortfall of Social Security over the next 75 years without 
any privatization of the system. 
 
 
II. Modeling Social Security 
 
SSA and CBO Forecast Models 
 
The SSA and CBO have each developed their own models for deriving Social Security 
projections.  The SSA uses a stochastic model that assigns random variations to 54 
                                                 
8 Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2006, page 192.  Available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pdf/spec.pdf.  GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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demographic and economic variables.
9  The model is run as a series of nine sequential 
modules, with the output from each module used as inputs into the other modules.  The 
CBO model also produces static simulations but can incorporate macroeconomic 
feedbacks and behavioral responses and produce distributional analyses.
10  The CBO 
model tracks the U.S. population through detailed age, gender, and marital status groups 
and, combined with economic assumptions, produces annual estimates of Social Security 
revenues and costs. 
 
Neither model is readily publicly available in sufficient detail to allow replication of the 
government projections and simulations under alternative assumptions.  This paper aims 
to develop a simplified model that can approximate the SSA and CBO results and 




As described above, the economic variables used to model Social Security revenues, 
outlays, and trust fund balances include the price level, unemployment, interest rates, 
GDP, and wages.  Only revenues and outlays need to be specifically modeled because the 
difference between revenues and outlays provides the annual net addition (or subtraction) 
to the trust funds, and the assumed interest rate can be used to calculate the interest 
received on the trust funds and the year-to-year balances in the funds. 
 
Social Security revenues come from three sources: Social Security taxes on wages, the 
taxation of Social Security benefits, and interest on the trust funds.  There are also three 
categories of costs: OASDI
11 benefit payments, administrative costs, and the cost of the 
Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) interchange.  While the railroad retirement system is 
operated separately from the Social Security system, the RRB interchange is an annual 
mandated transfer from the SSA to the RRB required to place the OASDI trust funds in 
the same position as if railroad retirement were covered by Social Security. 
 
As described in more detail below, we will generally use historical data on the operation 
of the trust funds to develop predictive models for each of these six output variables.  
Significant amendments were made to Social Security in 1983 and phased in over several 
years.  Thus, data prior to the mid-1980s are not considered in order to avoid variations 
arising from structural changes in the program.  While legislative changes to Social 
Security have been enacted since 1983, these amendments are relatively minor.  The 
current Social Security tax rate of 12.4% was first applied in 1990.  Thus, we base our 
models on data beginning in 1990 to ensure a stable tax rate and structural consistency. 
 
                                                 
9 The SSA model is summarized in A Stochastic Model of the Long-Range Financial Status  
of the OASDI Program, Actuarial Study No. 117, September 2004, SSA Pub. No. 11-11555.  Available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/NOTES/as117/as117.pdf.  
10 The CBO model is summarized in Overview of the Congressional Budget Office Long-Term (CBOLT) 
Policy Simulation Model,  January 2004, Technical Paper Series 2004-1.  Available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4994/2004-01.pdf.  
11 OASDI refers to Old-Age and Survivors Disability Insurance.  It is the official name of the federal Social 
Security program. GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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For each of the sources of revenue and costs, the output variable is modeled as a function 
of one or more economic and demographic variables.  All models in this analysis use the 
SSA’s demographic projections.  The six sections below described the methodology used 
to model each of the output variables.  The models’ results will be compared with the 
SSA and CBO forecasts later in this paper as a check of their validity.  The models will 
then be used to derive forecasts under alternative economic assumptions. 
 
Revenues from Social Security Taxes 
 
Social Security revenues from taxes on wages and salaries in year t are defined as: 
 




Workerst   = the number of workers covered by Social Security in year t 
Avg. Wagest  = the average annual wage per covered worker in year t 
Taxable Sharet = the share of income that is taxable by Social Security 
Tax Ratet  = the Social Security tax rate. 
 
The SSA provides historical data and long-range forecasts of the number of workers 
covered by Social Security.
12  While the SSA projections of the number of covered 
workers could be used directly in the above equation, these estimates include imbedded 
assumptions of the growth of the labor force and employment rates.  The approach taken 
here instead derives an estimate of the number of covered workers based on the size of 
the labor force and the unemployment rate.  This allows us to model different 
assumptions about the growth of the labor force and unemployment rates. 
 
We collected historical data on the size of the labor force, the unemployment rate, total 
employment, and the number of workers by Social Security.  The data on these variables 
for 1990-2003 are presented in Table 2.  The last column of Table 2 presents a ratio 
calculated as the number of covered workers to total average employment. 
 
The number of covered workers is consistently greater than total employment.  The 
reason is that many people are continually moving in and out of jobs and the labor force.  
We see in Table 2 that the ratio of covered workers to total employment is remarkably 
stable during 1990-2003.  The average ratio is 1.128 with a standard deviation of only 
0.004.  Based on the stability of this ratio, we conclude that a reasonably accurate 
estimate of the number of covered workers can be obtained from an estimate of the total 
labor force and the unemployment rate as: 
 
  Covered Workers = [Labor Force – (Labor Force * Unemployment Rate)] * 1.128 
 
 
                                                 
12 Table IV.B2 of the 2005 Trustees report.  Historical data provided every year from 1990-2004.  
Projections provided for every fifth year through 2080 (i.e., 2005, 2010, etc.). GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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Ratio of Covered 
Workers to 
Employment 
1990 125,840  5.6 118,793 133,672 1.125
1991 126,346  6.8 117,754 132,969 1.129
1992 128,105  7.5 118,497 133,890 1.130
1993 129,200  6.9 120,285 136,117 1.132
1994 131,056  6.1 123,062 138,681 1.123
1995 132,304  5.6 124,895 140,981 1.129
1996 133,943  5.4 126,710 143,427 1.132
1997 136,297  4.9 129,618 146,279 1.127
1998 137,673  4.5 131,478 149,146 1.132
1999 139,368  4.2 133,515 151,957 1.133
2000 142,583  4 136,880 154,732 1.123
2001 143,734  4.7 136,979 155,130 1.122
2002 144,863  5.8 136,461 154,488 1.127
2003 146,510  6 137,736 154,471 1.122
 
 
We use this formula to project the number of covered workers starting with the actual 
size of the U.S. labor force in 2004.  The SSA provides assumptions on the annual  
growth rate of the labor force in each of its three scenarios.  Combining this growth rate 
with an assumption of the unemployment rate provides an estimate of total employment.  
Then, multiplication of total employment by 1.128 yields an estimate of the number of 
covered workers for each year to 2080. 
 
Historical data on average wages in covered employment are given by the SSA.
14  Not all 
covered wages are subject to Social Security taxes because taxes are due only up to a 
specific cap, which is adjusted each year to account for the growth of wages.  For 
example, in 2004 Social Security taxes were paid only on the first $87,900 of income.  
The SSA also provides data on the average taxable income per covered worker.  These 
data are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 shows that the percentage of wages that are taxable under Social Security is not a 
constant but appears to be declining over time, although since 2000 there has been an 
increase in this percentage.  We assume that the percent of wages that are taxable will 
continue to decline in the future.  Note that this will produce a lower estimate of Social 
Security revenues compared to an assumption that the proportion of wages that are 
taxable will remain constant.  
                                                 
13 Labor force and employment data obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
14 Table 4.B1 of the 2004 Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin.  Available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2004/index.html.  GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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Table 3. Average Covered Wages, Average Taxable Covered Wages, and the Percent of 






Average Annual Wage 
per Covered Worker 
(Current Dollars) 
Average Annual Taxable 
Wage per Covered 
Worker (Current Dollars)
 
Percent of Wages 
Taxable 
1990 $20,238 $17,650 87.2% 
1991 20,756 18,214 87.8 
1992 21,775 18,902 86.8 
1993 22,211 19,369 87.2 
1994 23,133 20,153 87.1 
1995 24,126 20,703 85.8 
1996 25,018 21,433 85.7 
1997 26,403 22,478 85.1 
1998 28,045 23,691 84.5 
1999 29,518 24,777 83.9 
2000 31,386 26,081 83.1 
2001 32,013 27,129 84.7 
2002 32,152 27,582 85.8 
2003 32,808 28,201 86.0 
 
 
Time-series regression analysis of the data in Table 3 indicates that the percentage of 
wages that are taxable is declining, on average, by about a quarter percentage point per 
year.  Applying this coefficient throughout the 75-year planning horizon would result in 
only about 65% of wages being taxed by Social Security in 2080.  This appears to be an 
unrealistic assumption that is without historical precedent.  According to the SSA, the 
lowest percentage of wages subject to Social Security taxation was in 1965 when it fell to 
71%.
15  Except for this brief period in the mid-1960s, the percentage has rarely fallen 
below 79%. 
 
We assume values for the percentage of wages that are taxable based on their ability to 
replicate the revenue streams reported by the SSA for all scenarios.  We initially (in 
2005) assume that 84.0% of wages will be subject to Social Security taxation.  We then 
assume that the percentage of wages that are taxable will decline linearly by 0.08 
percentage points per year.  By the end of the 75-year planning period these assumptions 
reduce the taxable share of wages to 78.0%. 
 
The final step to estimate Social Security revenues from the taxation of wages is to 
multiply the wages subject to taxation by the tax rate.  Since 1990 Social Security wages 
have been subject to a total tax of 12.4%, split equally between employees and employers 
                                                 
15 Table 4.B1 of the 2003 Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, SSA Publication 
No. 13-11700, July 2004 GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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(self-employed workers pay the full 12.4% share themselves).  We assume, as does the 
SSA and CBO, that the tax rate will remain constant during the 75-year analysis period. 
 
Note that by changing the tax rate, one can determine the appropriate rate that would be 
necessary to bring the Social Security program into actuarial balance during the 75-year 
period.  The SSA presents estimates of these rates, under various assumptions, in their 
analysis.  Later in the paper we will also provide estimates of the tax adjustments 
necessary to bring the system into actuarial balance, and compare our values to those 
produced by the SSA as a validity check of our model. 
 
Revenue from the Taxation of Social Security Benefits 
 
Prior to the 1983 amendments, Social Security benefits were not subject to the federal 
income tax.  As a result of the 1983 changes, those tax filers with significant income from 
non-Social Security sources are required to pay federal income tax on some of their 
benefits.  The taxes collected on Social Security income are not disbursed to the Treasury 
as general revenues but are allocated to the Social Security trust funds. 
 
In 2004 the SSA received about $16 billion from the taxation of benefits.  While this is 
significantly smaller than the income received from Social Security taxes on wages and 
salaries ($553 billion in 2004), the share of total revenues from the taxation of benefits is 
expected to increase in the future.  Under current law the thresholds for the taxation of 
Social Security benefits are not indexed to inflation or wage growth.  The SSA states that 
their projections assume that the ratio of income from the taxation of benefits to total 
benefits will increase over time based on analysis by the Office of Tax Analysis in the 
Department of the Treasury.  However, no specifics are presented and the long-run 
analyses do not differentiate between income received from the taxation of benefits and 
from Social Security taxes on wages.   
 
The CBO analysis provides more details on the future taxation of benefits.  Their analysis 
indicates that under current law revenue from the taxation of benefits would rise from 
3.4% of benefits in 2003 to 9.4% in 2050 and 11% in 2090.  While the CBO analysis 
generally assumes that current laws will not be changed during the planning period, they 
assume that the tax code will be fully indexed to earnings beginning in 2015, which will 
slow the proportion of Social Security benefits that are taxed.  Under this assumption, the 
report indicates that revenues from the taxation of benefits will rise to 5.7% of benefits in 
2020 and stabilize at 6.6% of benefits in 2070.  We use these values in our analysis, using 
linear interpolation to smooth the data between these years.      
 
Revenue from Interest on the Trust Funds 
 
The final category of income received by the Social Security program is interest on the 
balance of the trust funds.  The amount of interest received is not a simple function of the 
current interest rate.  The trust funds are primarily invested in bonds with different rates 
of return and different maturity dates.  For example, in 2004 the annual rate of return on 
bonds held by the trust funds ranged from 3.5% to 8.75%.  Maturity dates extended as far GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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as 2019 but most of the bonds were set to mature several years earlier.  The SSA analysis 
of Social Security’s future assumes that interest rates will converge by 2013 to long-term 
stable values for the remainder of the 75-year planning period.  With the assumption of 
constant interest rates in the long run, the rate of return on the trust funds will gradually 
transition to a constant rate of return as older bonds, with varying rates of return, mature.  
The SSA projections provide details on the balance of the trust funds and interest 
received for 2005-2015 and for selected years in the long run.  These data indicate that by 
2015 the rate of return on the trust funds will essentially stabilize to the assumed long-run 
rate (for example, 5.8% in the intermediate case).  We use the SSA’s estimated annual 
rates of return on the trust funds for 2004-2014 for each scenario, with constant values 
from 2015-2080, as the basis for our projections. 
 
Cost of Benefit Payments 
 
The vast majority of the cost of Social Security (over 98%) is benefit payments to 
OASDI recipients.  The majority of recipients (over 60%) are retirees.  Other 
beneficiaries include dependents of retired workers, survivors of deceased workers, and 
disabled workers and their dependents.  Rather than separate our cost analysis by the type 
of recipient or the trust fund, we lump all benefit payments together to simplify the 
modeling approach. 
 
By definition, the total cost of OASDI benefit payments in year t is defined as: 
 
 Benefitst = Recipientst * Average Paymentt 
 
The number of Social Security recipients is a function of demographics.  The SSA 
provides historical estimates of the total number of OASDI beneficiaries, as well as 
projected estimates every five years for 2005-2080.
16  We use these projected values 
directly in our analysis, using linear interpolation to provide values for every year. 
 
The average Social Security payment changes over time depending on two primary 
factors.  First, the payments of existing beneficiaries are updated annually for a cost-of-
living adjustment (COLA).  The SSA calculates the COLA as the increase in the CPI-W 
averaged for July, August, and September from one year to the next.  We collected CPI-
W data from the BLS for comparison to the published COLAs to ensure these were 
similar.  The annual CPI growth rates provided by the SSA provide the annual COLAs 
applicable to the majority of beneficiaries.  
 
Figure 6 compares the percentage increase in OASDI average benefit payments with the 
COLA for 1986-2004.  The annual increase in average benefit payments is consistently 
slightly higher than the annual COLA.  On average, the increase in average benefit 
payments is 0.87 percentage points above the COLA, with a standard deviation of 0.23. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Table IV.B2. of the 2005 Trustees’ report.  Different projections are provided for each of the three 
scenarios. GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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The reason that average benefit payments tend to grow at a higher rate than the annual 
COLA is the turnover in the program.  Each year new beneficiaries begin receiving 
benefit payments while other beneficiaries die.  The SSA projections indicate that in all 
three scenarios the total number of beneficiaries will increase each year.  As the baby 
boom generation begins receiving benefit payments, the number of beneficiaries will 
grow rapidly (approximately 2-3% per year from 2010 to 2025).  Then the growth in 
beneficiaries will slow, reaching about 0.3-0.6% per year by the end of the 75-year 
analysis period. 
 
The turnover in the program is relevant because new beneficiaries may receive benefit 
payments that differ from beneficiaries that die each year.  In particular, new 
beneficiaries will receive higher monthly payments than older beneficiaries as long as 
real wages are growing because initial benefit payments are calculated based on indexed 
real wages.  Consider a beneficiary that retires in year t and receives an initial monthly 
benefit payment of $X.  This beneficiary will then have her monthly benefit payment 
adjusted annually by the COLA for as long as she lives.  If the annual COLA is a 
constant rate, r, then after t+n years her monthly benefit payment will be: 
 




Now consider a new retiree who begins receiving payments in year t+n.  In calculating 
his initial benefit payment, his past wages will be indexed for real wage growth during 
the period from year t to year t+n.
17  Assuming positive real wage growth, his benefits 
will be higher in year t+n than our other beneficiary.  The greater real wage growth 
during the previous n years, the greater the difference in benefit payments between these 
two recipients.   
 
                                                 
17 The SSA benefit formula actually indexes wage growth to the year a beneficiary turns 60 years old.  
However, the gap between the relevant wage index years in this example remains n years. GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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One approach for estimating the average benefit payments in future years would be to 
assume that each year average benefit payments increase by the projected COLA (equal 
to the CPI increase) plus the historical average of 0.87 percentage points.  However, the 
differential between the growth in average benefits and the COLA is not expected to be 
consistent across scenarios.  As mentioned above, the reason average benefits grow faster 
than the annual COLAs is the trend of real wage growth over time, providing new 
beneficiaries with higher initial benefit payments.  Given that the long-term assumptions 
of real wage growth vary across scenarios, we need to account for variations in wage 
growth.  We also need to account for variations in the growth of the total number of 
beneficiaries.  Ceteris paribus, one would expect that the larger the number of new 
beneficiaries in a particular year, the greater the growth in average benefit payments. 
 
We hypothesize that the growth in average benefit payments can be modeled as a linear 
function: 
 
 Payment  Growtht = (ß1 * COLAt) + (ß2 * Beneficiary Growtht) +  
(ß3 * Real Wage Growth[(t-n)→t]) 
 
The equation does not include an intercept term because with no inflation and no real 
wage growth, benefit payments should be constant.  For the COLA and the growth in 
beneficiaries, only year t is relevant.  However, for wage growth we need to consider, on 
average, the period from year t back to the year that those beneficiaries who die in year t 
began receiving benefit payments.  We assume this period averages 15 years for the 
current generation of retirees.
18  The wage growth variable is the average annual real 
wage growth over the previous 15 years.  Note that this value can be negative.   
 
We collected historical data on the COLAs, the number of OASDI beneficiaries, and real 
wage growth and used regression analysis to obtain estimates of the coefficients in the 
above equation.  While the estimated models
19 fit the historical data very well (R
2 values 
above 0.95), none of the equations proved to be accurate predictors of future benefit 
payment growth. 
 
Rather than using historical data to obtain the coefficients, we sought for coefficient 
values that could accurately predict the projected growth in benefit payments under all 
three scenarios.  The value of ß1 should be approximately one, as suggested by Figure 6.
20 
Knowing this we analyzed the growth in benefit payments using different values for ß2 
and ß3.  We ultimately determined that the choice of coefficients that most accurately fit 
the SSA projections was ß1=0.97, ß2=0.20, and ß3=0.80.  We use these coefficients in all 
our analyses to calculate average benefit payment growth for every year (2005-2080).  
We start with the known average benefit payment in 2004 and then calculate the annual 
                                                 
18 This assumption is based on Table V.A3 of the 2005 Trustees’ report. 
19 Several different models were estimated using different historical periods (e.g., 1986-2004, 1990-2004). 
20 Consider that if there is no real wage growth, average benefit payments would increase by exactly the 
COLA each year.  The value of ß1 could be slightly less than one if we consider that most, but not all, 
beneficiaries will have their benefit payments increased annually by the COLA.  The regression models all 
produced a value of ß1 that was approximately one. GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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growth in average benefits using the above equation.  With this time series indicating the 
annual growth in average benefit payments, we then obtain an estimate of the average 
benefit payment for every year.  This is then multiplied by the number of recipients to 




Historical data on administrative costs indicate that administrative costs have not been a 
constant percentage of benefit payments.  Administrative costs were about 1.2% of 
benefits in the late 1980s.  Since 1990, administrative costs have consistently been less 
than 1.0% of benefit payments, with the lowest estimates at around 0.85% of benefits.   
 
The SSA provides annual estimates of administrative costs for their short-range forecast 
analysis (2005-2014).  In their intermediate scenario these estimates show a consistent 
decline in administrative costs as a percentage of benefit payments, reaching 0.75% of 
benefits in 2014.  We use the SSA’s implied percentages for 2005-2014 and then assume 
that administrative costs remain 0.75% of benefit payments for the rest of the 75-year 
analysis period. 
 
Railroad Retirement Board Interchange Costs   
 
RRB interchange costs are estimated in a similar manner to administrative costs.  Actual 
RRB interchange costs have generally declined as a percentage of benefit payments since 
the mid-1980s.  The SSA’s intermediate scenario shows a continuing decline in the costs 
of the RRB interchange from 0.73% of benefit payments in 2005 to 0.55% in 2014.  We 
use these 2004-2014 values in our analysis and assume that RRB costs remain at 0.55% 
of benefit payments thereafter. 
 
 
III. Model Validity 
 
We now consider the ability of our modeling approach to replicate the results published 
by the government agencies.  Only if our model can produce baseline results similar to 
the more complex government models can we place some validity in our analysis of 
alternative policy scenarios.  We consider several comparisons as a validity check of our 
mode: 
 
1.  The annual time series of Social Security revenues and costs 
2.  The predicted year of trust fund depletion in the intermediate and high cost 
scenarios and the percentage of scheduled benefits that can be paid thereafter 
3.  The trust fund balance over time in the low cost scenario 
4.  The adjustment to the current Social Security tax rate of 12.4% that would be 
necessary to bring the system into actuarial balance for the 75-year period in each 
scenario 
5.  Sensitivity of the results to changes in the assumed rate of real wage growth 
6.  Comparison to the CBO projections  GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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In all comparisons we use the same demographic and economic assumptions used by the 
SSA (or CBO).  Thus, any differences can be attributed to the difference in model 
structure, not the underlying assumptions.  We now report on the accuracy of our model 
considering each of these criteria. 
 
Comparison to the SSA Projections of Revenues and Costs 
 
The SSA provides annual estimates of Social Security revenues (excluding interest on the 
trust funds) and total costs for 2005-2014 and then estimates every 5 years (i.e., 2015, 
2020, etc.) to 2080.  We compared the SSA time series of revenues and costs to the 
predictions of our models.  Tables 4 and 5 present the comparisons for several years and 
indicate the differential between the SSA data and our results.  The revenue predictions 
produced by our models tend to be slightly higher than those produced by the SSA with 
differentials of less than 6%.  The differences generally decrease in magnitude over time.  
The average revenue differential (in absolute value) in Table 4 is 3.3%.  The majority of 
our cost projections (Table 5) are also within 6% of the SSA values, and all cost 
estimates are within 9%.  The differences tend to be largest in the middle of the planning 
period.  The average differential for the cost comparison is 3.5%. 
 
 
Table 4. Comparison of Social Security Revenue Projections, Excluding Trust Fund 
Interest, for Selected Years (Billions of Current Dollars) 
 
Intermediate Scenario  Low Cost Scenario  High Cost Scenario   
Year  SSA Model Diff.  SSA Model Diff.  SSA Model Diff. 
2005 $596  $629  +5.5% $596 $629 +5.5% $588  $611  +3.9%
2020 1,221  1,288 +5.5 1,181 1,237 +4.7 1,305  1,387 +6.3
2040 2,837  2,920 +2.9 2,571 2,630 +2.3 3,286  3,421 +4.1
2060 6,456  6,505 +0.8 5,666 5,669 +0.1 7,795  7,983 +2.4
2080 14,573  14,336  -1.6 12,591 12,216 -3.0 17,939  18,103  +0.9
 
Table 5. Comparison of Social Security Total Cost Projections for Selected Years 
(Billions of Current Dollars) 
 
Intermediate Scenario  Low Cost Scenario  High Cost Scenario   
Year  SSA  Model  Diff. SSA  Model  Diff. SSA  Model Diff. 
2005 $527 $525  -0.4% $525 $523 -0.4% $530 $528 -0.4%
2020 1,318 1,375  +4.3 1,152 1,194 +3.6 1,566 1,655  +5.7
2040 3,756 3,953  +5.2 2,867 2,981 +4.0 5,118 5,547  +8.4
2060 8,799 8,958  +1.8 6,074 6,053 -0.3 13,505 14,397  +6.6
2080 20,879 20,298  -2.8 13,335 12,639 -5.2 35,095 36,163  +3.0
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Comparison of Trust Fund Depletion Dates and Potential Benefit Payments Thereafter 
 
In both the intermediate and high cost scenarios the SSA projects that the combined 
Social Security trust funds will become depleted within the 75-year planning period.  In 
the intermediate scenario the trust funds are expected to become exhausted in 2041.  In 
the high cost scenario, the depletion date is projected to be 2030.  Our models predict the 
same trust fund depletion years.  In the intermediate scenario our model predicts a 
positive trust fund balance of $425 billion at the beginning of 2041 but a negative balance 
of $658 by the end of that year.  In the high cost scenario our model predicts a balance of 
$294 billion at the start of 2030 and a negative $778 billion balance by the start of 2031. 
 
In the intermediate scenario the SSA estimates that once the trust funds are depleted in 
2041 revenues would be sufficient to pay only 74% of scheduled benefits, gradually 
declining to 70% in 2080.  Our model produces very similar estimates – that revenues 
would cover 74% of scheduled benefits immediately after the trust funds are depleted in 
2041, declining to 71% in 2080.  In the high cost scenario the SSA projects that 
immediately following the depletion of the trust funds in 2030 revenues would pay for 
69% of scheduled benefits, declining to 51% in 2080.
21  Our model predicts that in the 
high cost scenario revenues would cover 67% of scheduled benefits immediately 
following the depletion of the trust funds in 2030, falling to 50% in 2080.  Again, our 
model’s results compare very closely to those of the SSA. 
 
Trust Fund Balances in the Low Cost Scenario 
 
In the low cost scenario the SSA projects that the trust funds will not become depleted 
during the 75-year planning period.  When we use our model to analyze the low cost 
scenario, we also estimate that the trust fund will retain a positive balance over time.  The 
trust fund balances over time in the low cost scenario are compared graphically in Figure 
7.  Our model predicts trust fund balances that are greater than those projected by the 
SSA.  The differential increases over time – in 2020 the total trust fund balance is 10% 
greater in our analysis but by 2080 the differential is 27%.  At the beginning of the 
difference primarily arises because our revenue projections exceed those of the SSA.  
However by the end of the period the difference is a result of cost projections that are 
lower than those estimated by the SSA. 
 
Comparison of Actuarial Balance Requirements 
 
The SSA estimates the adjustment to the current Social Security tax rate of 12.4% that 
would be necessary in each scenario to bring the system into actuarial balance for the 75-
year planning period.
22  In the intermediate and high cost scenarios, where the trust funds 
become depleted, the tax rate would need to be increased.  In the low cost scenario, the 
SSA estimate the maximum decrease in the tax rate that would still leave the system in 
balance in 2080. 
                                                 
21 Calculations for the SSA based on Table VI.F9 of the 2005 Trustees’ report.  
22 The adjustment to the tax rate is assumed to be made immediately and then maintained without further 
change during the 75-year period. GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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Table 6 compares the actuarial balance requirements of the SSA with our estimates based 
on each of the three scenarios.  Using the assumptions for the intermediate scenario, our 
model estimates that the Social Security tax would need to be increased from 12.4% up to 
14.25% in order to bring the system into balance over the 75-year planning period.  This 
is very similar to the SSA’s estimate of 14.32%.  In the low cost scenario our model 
estimates that Social Security taxes could be lowered slightly more than the SSA.  In the 
high cost scenario both the SSA and our results estimate that Social Security taxes would 
need to be increased to around 17.5% to bring the system into balance in 2080. 
 
 
Table 6. Comparison of Actuarial Balance Requirements 
 
Intermediate Scenario  Low Cost Scenario  High Cost Scenario 
SSA Model SSA  Model  SSA Model 
+1.92% +1.85% -0.38% -0.59%  +4.96% +5.26% 
 
 
Comparison of Sensitivity to Changes in Real Wage Growth 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, one of the policy scenarios that we want 
to consider is the sensitivity of the long-run Social Security projections to changes in the 
growth rate of real wages.  The SSA provides sensitivity analyses that consider changes 
to various demographic and economic variables.  For the economic variables the SSA 
uses the demographic assumptions in the intermediate scenario and then changes the 
values of one economic variable from its values in the intermediate scenario to its values 
in the low cost and high cost scenarios.  The results then indicate the new adjustment to 
the Social Security tax rate that would be required to bring the system into actuarial 




For the real wage growth sensitivity analysis the SSA continues to use the intermediate 
scenario assumption of long-range CPI growth (2.8% per year).  The nominal wage 
growth is then adjusted to produce real wage growth values that match those in the low 
cost and high cost scenarios (1.6% and 0.6% per year respectively).  Recall that in the 
intermediate scenario, the SSA estimates that the Social Security tax rate would need to 
be increased by 1.92% to bring the system into balance (Table 6).  The SSA estimates 
that using the low cost assumptions of real wage growth (and keeping all other variables 
at their intermediate scenario values) the required tax rate increase would only be 1.39%.  
Using the high cost scenario assumptions of real wage growth, the required tax increase 
would be 2.45%. 
 
Table 7 compares the SSA sensitivity analyses results for changes in real wage growth 
with our results.  The comparison shows that our values are very similar to those 
produced by the SSA, with our results indicating slightly more sensitivity to changes in 
the long-run rate of real wage growth.  Our results indicate that a long-term growth rate 
for real wages of 1.6% instead of 1.1% would, ceteris paribus, reduce the required 
increase in the Social Security tax rate for actuarial balance in 2080 by 0.61 percentage 
points – compared to a reduction of 0.53 percentage points estimated by the SSA.  A 
lower long-term growth rate for real wages, 0.6% instead of 1.1%, would require a larger 




Table 7. Comparison of Real Wage Growth Sensitivity Analysis Results (Tax Rate 
Adjustment Required for Actuarial Balance) 
 
Scenario SSA  Model 
Intermediate Baseline (1.1% long-run 





Low Cost Assumptions (1.6% long-





High Cost Assumptions (0.6% long-







Comparison with the CBO Social Security Analysis 
 
The final validity check we perform is to use the CBO economic assumptions in our 
model and compare our projections with those produced by the CBO.  The CBO projects 
that the combined Social Security trust funds will become depleted in 2052.  Our model 
projects that the trust funds will become depleted in 2044 using the CBO economic 
assumptions.  While this is three years later than in the baseline intermediate scenario 
analysis, it is eight years earlier than the CBO projection.  As neither the CBO nor the 
SSA has produced analyses using the exact same set of assumptions that the other agency 
uses, there may be structural differences in the CBO and SSA modeling approaches.  We GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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have based our models on the SSA results.  Thus the fact that our model projects a 
different trust fund depletion date than the CBO may reflect differences between the 
CBO and SSA modeling approach. 
 
Summary of Validity Check 
 
The validity checks performed above indicate that our relatively simple model produces 
projections that generally match quite well with the results published by the SSA.  Our 
estimates of future Social Security revenues and costs, trust fund depletion dates, 
actuarial balance requirements, and sensitivity to changes in the growth rate of real wages 
are very similar to the comparable values produced by the SSA.  In the low cost scenario, 
our model projects a higher trust fund balance over time.  Using the CBO economic 
assumptions instead of the SSA intermediate scenario assumptions, our model correctly 
predicts that the trust funds will become depleted later but only by three years instead of 
eleven years. 
 
Overall, the validity comparisons suggest that our models produce results that are 
reasonably comparable to those produced by the SSA, even though the latter uses much 
more complex modeling approaches.   
 
We now turn to an analysis of several policy scenarios.  The validity checks suggest that 
the results below should be reasonably close to the values that would be produced by the 
SSA if they used their modeling approach to analyze the same policy scenarios. 
 
 
IV. Policy Analysis 
 
Analysis of the Federal Budget Economic Assumptions 
 
The first alternative policy scenario we consider with our model is the future finances of 
the Social Security program using the economic assumptions made in the federal budget.  
We input the 2005-2010 federal budget assumptions for wage growth, inflation, interest 
rates, and unemployment into our model using the demographic assumptions in the 
SSA’s intermediate scenario.  We then apply the 2010 federal budget assumptions for the 
duration of the 75-year planning period.   
 
Figure 8 presents the projected trust fund balance over time using the federal budget 
assumptions as compared to the balance our model predicts using the SSA’s intermediate 
set of demographic and economic assumptions.  Using the federal budget assumptions the 
Social Security trust funds are still depleted during the 75-year planning period but they 
do not become exhausted until 2065 – 24 years later than projected by the SSA in their 
intermediate scenario.  While our model estimates that Social Security taxes would need 
to be increased by 1.85 percentage points to bring the system into balance for the 75-year 
period in the baseline intermediate scenario (similar to the SSA estimate of 1.92 
percentage points), using the federal budget assumptions an increase of only 0.24 
percentage points would be required.  In other words, using the federal budget  GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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Figure 8. Comparison of Combined Trust Fund Balances Using SSA’s Intermediate 
















































assumptions our models estimate that the Social Security shortfall for the next 75 years 
could be offset with an increase in the Social Security tax rate from 12.4% to 12.64%.  
This would be equivalent to an additional tax of $120 for a wage earner making $50,000 
per year. 
 
Variation in Economic Assumptions Required for Actuarial Balance 
 
Next we consider what changes in economic assumptions would be necessary to bring the 
Social Security system into balance over the period 2005-2080.  We start this analysis 
with the SSA assumptions for the intermediate scenario and then adjust the long-run 
assumed value for a single variable until the trust funds reach a positive combined 
balance in 2080.  For example, with real wages we incrementally increase the long-term 
real wage growth rate from 1.1% until the trust funds show a positive balance remaining 
in 2080, while keeping all other variables constant at their intermediate scenario values. 
 
We first consider increasing the long-run real wage growth.  As shown in Table 8, the 
long-run real wage would need to increase by 2.85% per year in order to bring the system 
into balance – a significant increase from the 1.1% annual growth assumed in the SSA 
intermediate scenario.  The system could also be brought into balance by lowering the 
assumed rate of inflation from 2.8% to about 1.5% in the long run.  While a lower 
unemployment rate would improve the finances of the program, lowering the rate to zero 
would not be sufficient to bring the system into balance.  A higher real rate of return on 
the trust fund balances, from 3.0% to about 5.5% would keep a positive balance in the 
trust funds through 2080. 
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Table 8. Changes in Economic Assumptions Required to Bring the Social Security 






Long-Term Assumption in 
SSA Intermediate Scenario 
Long-Term Assumption 
Required for Actuarial 
Balance through 2080 
Real Wage Growth  1.1%  2.85% 
Inflation Rate  2.8%  1.54% 
Unemployment Rate  5.5%  NA
23 
Real Interest Rate  3.0%  5.58% 
 
 
Table 8 considers changes in only one variable at a time.  We also consider combinations 
of changes in long-term economic assumptions that would result in actuarial balance 
through 2080.  Four such combinations are presented in Table 9.  While none of these 
sets of assumptions entirely fall within the assumed values in the SSA’s scenarios, they 
are intended to illustrate the point that macroeconomic policies affecting these variables 
provide an option for addressing at least a portion of the projected Social Security 
shortfall through 2080.      
 
 
Table 9. Four Combinations of Long-Term Economic Assumptions that Bring the Social 
Security System into Actuarial Balance through 2080 
 
Variable       
Real Wage Growth  2.3%  1.8%  2.3%  1.6% 
Inflation Rate  2.2%  2.2%  1.7%  2.0% 
Unemployment Rate  4.5%  4.0%  3.5%  1.5% 
Real Interest Rate  4.4%  5.1%  4.9%  4.8% 
 
 
Social Security Policy Options 
 
Finally, we consider policy adjustments that would bring the system into actuarial 
balance through 2080.  One suggestion that has been made to improve Social Security’s 
finances is to increase or eliminate the income cap subject to taxation.  There is a recent 
precedent for this approach as the income limit subject to the Medicare Hospital 
Insurance tax was eliminated under the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. 
 
As explained earlier, our analysis assumes that 84% of wage and salary income will be 
subject to Social Security taxation in 2005, declining to 78% by 2080.  Our model 
indicates that setting the cap such that the percentage of income subject to taxation 
remains constant at 84% during the planning period would extend the duration of the trust 
funds only slightly – from 2041 to 2043.   
                                                 
23 Even if the unemployment rate were 0% Social Security would not be in actuarial balance through 2080. GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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We explored whether increasing the cap on income subject to Social Security taxation 
could be used to close the actuarial gap.  We incrementally increased the percentage of 
wages subject to Social Security taxation until the system shows a positive balance in the 
trust funds in 2080.  This requires that 93.8% of wage and salary income be subject to 
Social Security taxation.  In recent decades, the share of income subject to Social 
Security taxation reached as high as 90.0% in the early 1980s. 
 
An examination of the 2002 distribution of wage and salary income published by the 
Internal Revenue Service
24 indicates that 86.0% of all wage and salary income was 
captured by federal tax returns with incomes of $200,000 or less.  Considering all returns 
with total wage and salary income of $500,000 or less increases the share of wage and 
salary income covered to 93.7%.  An exact determination of the required change in the 
salary cap to bring the Social Security system into balance cannot be made as many 
income tax returns combine the incomes of two or more individuals.  However, the IRS 
data suggest that approximately doubling the cap on income subject to Social Security 
taxation would be required to close the actuarial gap through 2080.  Note that this 
estimate assumes no change in benefit payments, only an increase in revenues.  Given 
that benefit payments are linked to the maximum income subject to Social Security 
taxation, under the current benefit formula any increase in the income cap would also 
result in higher benefits for high-income workers.  Thus the largest improvement in 
Social Security’s finances would result from a combination of a higher income cap and 
an adjustment of the benefit formula to lower the initial benefits of high-income workers. 
 
Another suggestion to reduce the shortfall in Social Security finances is to reduce the 
growth in benefit payments, perhaps by indexing one’s initial benefit payment to account 
for the growth in prices rather than wages.  In the baseline intermediate scenario, our 
model projections that nominal benefit payments increase an average of 3.8% per year 
over the period 200-2080.  We can then reduce the growth rate of average benefit 
payments until a positive balance remained in the trust funds in 2080.  First, we limit the 
annual growth of benefit payments to the growth of the CPI (2.8% in the long run).  
Doing so is more than sufficient to bring the program into balance – annual revenues 
continually exceed annual costs, and by 2080 the trust funds have a large accumulated 
balance of $443 trillion.  Next we incrementally reduced the annual growth in average 
benefit payments until the system was brought into balance.  Our results indicate that 
slowing the growth in benefit payments by 11% (from 3.8% per year to 3.4% per year) 
would be required to avoid exhausting the trust funds by 2080.  Note that even with this 
reduction in the growth of benefit payments the payments made to beneficiaries still grow 
in real terms.  Reducing the annual growth in average benefit payments by 11% still 
permits benefit payments to grow in real terms by 58% between 2005 and 2080.  This 
compares to real growth in average benefit payments of 114% in our baseline analysis of 
the SSA’s intermediate scenario. 
 
We also considered the extent to which the financial shortfall could be addressed through 
the taxation of Social Security benefit payments.  As mentioned earlier, our model 
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assumes that the current thresholds for the taxation of Social Security benefits will be 
indexed to the growth of wages in the future.  Using estimates provided in the CBO 
analysis of Social Security, we first consider the impact of maintaining the current 
thresholds for the taxation of benefits.  Our model estimates that this adjustment would 
have little effect on the finances of Social Security – the trust funds would become 
exhausted just one year later.  Maintaining the current thresholds would reduce the 
increase in the Social Security tax required for actuarial balance from 1.85% to 1.58%. 
 
Maintaining the current income tax thresholds would, according to the CBO, result in an 
overall tax rate on Social Security benefit payments of about 10% by 2080 (up from 
about 3.5% now).  Suppose instead that Social Security benefit payments became fully 
taxable immediately.  Assume that the overall tax rate on benefit payments was 
immediately raised to 10%.  This would extend a positive balance on the trust funds out 
to 2049 and would reduce the necessary tax rate increase for actuarial balance from 
1.85% to 1.19%.  Actuarial balance would be achieved by raising the overall tax rate on 
Social Security benefits to 17.6%.  Given that the majority of Social Security recipients 
are in the 10% or 15% federal income tax brackets, the taxation of Social Security 
benefits does not appear to be a policy that alone could be used to eliminate the shortfall. 
 
Of course, the projected gap in Social Security’s finances can be closed using a 
combination of policy options.  Also, any changes could be phased in gradually over 
time.  We determined a few policy combinations that could be used to bring Social 
Security into actuarial balance through 2080.  These include: 
 
•  Gradually raise the cap on income subject to Social Security taxation such that 
the percentage of wage and salary income taxed increases from 84% currently to 
90% in 2017 (an increase of 0.5% per year) AND reduce the growth of benefit 
payments by 16% annually (which will still allow real benefit payments to nearly 
double between 2005 and 2080).  OR: 
•  Gradually raise the cap on income subject to Social Security taxation such that 
the percentage of wage and salary income taxed increases from 84% to 90% in 
2017 (an increase of 0.5% per year) AND increase the Social Security tax rate by 
0.1 percentage points per year from 12.4% to 13.1% in 2013.  OR: 
•  Maintain the current thresholds for the taxation of Social Security benefit 
payments AND gradually raise the cap on income subject to Social Security 
taxation such that the percentage of wage and salary income taxed increases from 
84% to 90% in 2017 (an increase of 0.5% per year) AND immediately increase 
the Social Security tax rate from 12.4% to 12.8%. 
 
Caveats and Limitations 
 
We have presented our results as deterministic.  In reality there is considerable 
uncertainty in any analysis of the future of Social Security.  The CBO explicitly models 
this uncertainty in their analysis – they estimate an 80% confidence interval for the date 
the trust funds become exhausted as between 2034 and 2085.  The SSA also provides 
confidence intervals but theirs are considerably narrower than those estimated by the GDAE Working Paper No. 05-03 Securing Social Security 
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CBO – the SSA 80% confidence interval for the depletion of the trust funds is between 
2035 and 2052.  No information is provided regarding why the SSA intervals are 
significantly narrower.  Clearly, our results must also be viewed in light of significant 
uncertainty. 
 
Similar to the CBO and SSA, our models assume that economic variables will maintain 
constant values in the long run.  In reality the economy will go through business cycles 
that are impossible to predict.  The timing and duration of these cycles can have an 
impact on the requirements to bring the Social Security system into actuarial balance. 
 
We have not explored the sensitivity of our projections to variations in demographic 
assumptions such as life expectancy, fertility, and labor force participation rates.  These 
variables are likely to be as important to the future finances of Social Security as 
economic factors.  While different assumptions regarding demographic variables may 
produce significantly different forecasts, these variables are generally less influenced by 
policy decisions.  Thus, we have limited our focus to economic policy options. 
 
Our policy analyses have focused on bringing Social Security into actuarial balance 
through 2080.  Note that doing so would, in all cases, still leave a shortfall in 2081 and 
beyond, when revenues will exceed costs and the trust funds will be depleted.  Further 
changes would be required to bring the system into balance for a longer period into the 
future.  Considering the significant uncertainty of future economic and demographic 
conditions and the fluxes of politics, it would be naive to suggest that Social Security 
could be indefinitely “fixed” now.  Thus, we do not perform any analyses using an 
infinite planning horizon and consider the 75-year planning period sufficient.  Most 
likely, any “permanent” adjustments would still require further changes in the future as 
actual values become known and expectations are revised. 
 
Finally, our purpose was to construct a simple model that reasonably replicates the 
baseline and policy analysis of the SSA and gives some indication of the future of Social 
Security under alternative assumptions.  We believe we have succeeded based on the 
validity checks conducted with our models.  While similar analysis by the SSA (or the 






The Bush administration has indicated that Social Security is facing a crisis that requires 
prompt and sweeping reforms structured around a centerpiece of private investment 
accounts.  The president has stated that the system will be “bankrupt” in 2041 based on 
the SSA’s 2005 report on the finances of the Social Security system.  As various policy 
options are debated for Social Security reform, several important points need to be kept 
in mind. 
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First, the projections of Social Security’s future finances are based on demographic and 
economic assumptions involving considerable uncertainty.  Even within the Bush 
administration, different sets of assumption regarding future economic conditions have 
been published.  The federal budget makes relatively optimistic economic assumptions 
compared to those made by the Social Security Administration.  The Congressional 
Budget Office economic assumptions fall between these two extremes.  We have shown 
in this paper that the use of different sets of assumptions can have a significant impact on 
the future of Social Security.  In particular, while the SSA’s intermediate scenario 
predicts that the combined Social Security trust funds will become depleted in 2041 our 
analysis based on the federal budget assumptions projects that, without any policy 
changes, the trust funds will persist until 2065.   
 
A second important point is that forecasts regarding the future of Social Security have 
been, and will continue to be, periodically revised.  In the 1997 Social Security Trustees’ 
report the intermediate scenario predicted that the combined trust funds would become 
depleted in 2029.  Just five years later, in the 2002 report, the projected date for the 
depletion of the trust funds had been extended to 2041.  As more information is available 
and expectations are altered, future Social Security reports will present revised analyses.  
A potential danger of a major overhaul intended to “permanently” fix Social Security is 
that changes in demographic or economic conditions will dictate that additional, possibly 
significant, changes be made.  A measured approach that allows for future flexibility 
appears most desirable.  One option would be to schedule periodic adjustments to the 
system as expectations are revised. 
 
Thirdly, there is a wide range of policy options for making adjustments to the Social 
Security program.  While the president has advocated the use of private accounts, we 
have shown in this paper that several other policies, either individually or combined, can 
be used to improve the future finances of Social Security.  Among these are an increase 
in the cap on income subject to Social Security taxation, a reduction in the growth rate of 
benefit payments, an increase in the Social Security tax rate, and an increase in the 
taxation of Social Security benefits. 
 
All of the policy options just mentioned for improving the finances of Social Security 
boil down to either a reduction in benefits or an increase in taxes.  Of course, such 
options are politically unpopular.  But if considered fully, these policies do not 
necessarily imply a net loss of income over a lifetime.  The demographic changes taking 
place in the United States are the driving force motivating changes in the Social Security 
program.  For example, life expectancy at age 65 is projected to increase from about 16 
years for an American male in 2005 to over 20 years in 2080.  American females will see 
life expectancy at age 65 increase from 19 years to 23 years over the same period.
25  Thus 
Social Security beneficiaries will, on average, receive their benefits for a longer period of 
time.  In essence, this is equivalent to an increase in benefits arising from longer life 
expectancies.  Greater benefit payments can only be funded through increased revenues.  
This can be accomplished by, for instance, raising Social Security taxes.  But while an 
individual will pay higher Social Security taxes during his or her working years, this will 
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be offset by receiving scheduled benefits for a longer period of time.  Similarly, lower 
benefits during one’s retirement years would be offset by receiving those benefits for 
more years.  Again, beneficiaries do not necessarily suffer a loss of benefits in the long 
run. 
 
The finances of Social Security are also affected by macroeconomic conditions that may 
be subject to influence through policies.  In particular, macroeconomic policies that 
increase the growth of real wages, limit inflation, and reduce unemployment – policies 
that are desirable in themselves – will have the additional benefit of improving the future 
of Social Security.  In this paper we have indicated several different policy options and 
macroeconomic conditions that can bring the Social Security program into actuarial 
balance through 2080 without resorting to the use of private accounts. 
 
The Bush administration has been forwarding its agenda on Social Security using words 
such as “crisis” and “bankrupt.”   We believe the system is not in crisis and cannot go 
bankrupt as long as revenues continue to be collected.  It is true, however, that under a 
range of plausible economic assumptions the program will not be able to provide 
currently scheduled benefits through 2080.  The Social Security program will need to be 
adjusted to reflect modern realities, just as it has been many times in the past 70 years.  
We hope this paper provides some clarity regarding the feasibility and effectiveness of 
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